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INTERROGATION OF EMPLOYEES AS AN UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE*
EMPLOYERS frequently question an employee about his union attitudes,
membership, or activities.' Such questioning violates Section 8(a) (1) of the
Taft-Hartley Act if it results in an interference with the worker's right to
form, join, or assist labor organizations.2 The Courts of Appeals have
generally held that interrogation does not violate the Act,8 unless so linked
with other anti-union acts that it is part of a pattern of hostility directed
against union activity. 4 Some courts rationalize this "course of conduct" test
by analogizing questioning to employer speechmaking.P Since employer state-
*NLRB v. Jackson Press, Inc., 201 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1953).
1. The NLRB decided approximately 260 interrogation cases from Jan., 1949 to
March, 1953.
2. Section 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (Supp. 1952). Section 7 provides that "em-
ployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations. .. ." 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1952).
Questions held illegal include those relating to (1) ernployees' union membership:
I. B. S. Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1265 (1951); Dinion Coil Co., 96 N.L.R.B.
1435, 1436 (1951); (2) attitude of employees toward the union: Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1949), enforceinent granted, 179 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.
1950) ; NLRB v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376, 378 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 824 (1947) ; (3) union activities: NLRB v. Norfolk Southern Bus Corp.,
159 F.2d 516, 518 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 884 (1947); R. R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 635, 638 (1945), enforcement granted, 156 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.
1946) ; (4) voting intentions of employees: Artcraft Hosiery Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 333, 333-4
(1948); (5) identity of union organizers or active union members: Morristown Knit-
ting Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 731, 743 (1948).
. At least four circuits have taken this view. See, e.g., NLRB v. England Bros.,
Inc., 201 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39 (6th Cir, 1952) ;
NLRB v. Arthur Winer, Inc., 194 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952) ;
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Tennessee
Coach Co., 191 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1951) ; John S. Barnes Corp. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 127
(7th Cir. 1951) ; Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948).
Some circuits in interrogation cases have affirmed the Board without discussion. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Hibriten Chair Co., 197 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Wytheville
Knitting Mills, 175 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1949). For the Eighth Circuit's view, see note 30
infra.
4. See, e.g., Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1948) (first case applying
the "course of conduct" rule to interrogation) ; NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39, 43
(6th Cir. 1952). For discussion see Burstein, Free Speech for Employers, 1 LAtoR L.J,
425, 435-6 (1950).
5. "Such perfunctory, innocuous remarks and queries, standing alone . . . are in-
sufficient to support a finding of a violation of Section 8(1). They come instead within
the protection of free speech protected by the First Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. The Supreme Court indicated that speech would not be sufficient to sustain a
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ments have long been allowed unless containing a threat or as part of a coer-
cive course of conduct,0 these courts have permitted interrogation when the
employer has not committed other unfair labor practices.
But despite the "course of conduct" rule in the Courts of Appeals, the
National Labor Relations Board consistently holds that interrogation is per se
a violation of Section S(a) (1).7 In the Board's view, the isolated act of
questioning is sufficient to constitute an infraction; no other anti-union act
by the employer need be shown.8 Neither the employer's motives in making
inquiries about union affairs, nor the coercive effects of a particular question
are relevant under the NLRB test.0 However, despite its per se rule, the
Board has occasionally allowed interrogation when some overriding necessity
justified the questions or when the coercive effect of the questions was
obviously de .ninhnis. Thus, the NLRB has allowed questioning needed for
the preparation of an employer's defense against an unfair labor practice
charge.10 And questions asked with the consent of the union or casual
interrogation by minor supervisors have been held too innocuous to warrant
issuance of a remedial order.1
finding of a violation of Section 8(1) in NLRB v. Virginia Power Co., 314 U.S. 469
(1941)... ." Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 1943). See also NLRB v.
Montgomery 'Ward & Co., 192 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1951) (statements and questions
treated together under the "free speech" section of the Taft-Hartley Act).
6. NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941) (first application
of the "course of conduct" rule to employer speeches). For a discussion of subsequent
cases on employer speechmaking, see Daykin, Employers' Right of Free Speech in Ir,-
dustry under the NLR,4, 40 ILT. L. REv. 1835 (1945); Comment, 34 CALM. L REv. 415
(1946).
There is dispute in the cases over whether § S(c), added to the Act in 1947, merely
codified the existing "course of conduct" doctrine, or extended additional protection to
speechmaking. For discussion of §8(c), see 2 TEL=~r, Luoi Dxsuvnus Arm Com ucn
BAREmarING, §§ 393.105-7 (1950); Cox, Sone Aspects of the Labor Manageen t Rela-
tioss Act, 61 HI.nv. L. Rxv. 1, 15-20 (1947) ; Note, 33 VA. L. Rxv. 1037, 1047-55 (1952).
7. See, e.g., Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (March 10, 1953);
Washington Mills, 100 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (July 10, 1952); Calcasieu Paper Co., 99
N.L.R.B. No. 122 (June 18, 1952) ; Waynline, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 511 (1949).
8. See, e.g., Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 N.LR.B. No. 26 (March 10, 1953);
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1949).
9. See, e.g., New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 604, 605 (190) ; The F. C.
Russell Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 206, 209 (1950).
10. See, e.g., Cold Spring Granite Co., 101 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (Dec. S, 1952); May
Department Stores Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 94 (1946), enforceent granted, 162 F2d 247 (8th
Cir. 1947). But cf., Cummer-Graham Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 722 (1951) (questioning held il-
legal since interrogation could not have constituted preparation for defense); Joy Sill:
Mills v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (questions must be relevant to charges
of unfair labor practice to justify the risk of intimidation).
11. See, e.g., Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 11S5, 1187 (1943) (questions
asked with consent of the union and in the presence of union representatives) ; Capital
Lumber Co., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (March 2, 1953) (foreman's attitude while question-
ing appeared neutral and friendly); U.S. Gypsum Co., 93 N.LR.B. 96,, 969 (1951)
(questioning by a minor supervisor); Boston & Lockport Block Co., 93 N.LR.B. 6%,
692 (1952) (questioning too innocuous to warrant remedial order).
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In the recent case of NLRB v. Jackson Press, Inc.,'" the Seventh Circuit
moved from the "course of conduct" rule towards the Board's per se doc-
trine. In this case the employer, during an organizational campaign, ques-
tioned two employees about their union sympathies.'8 The court found that
the employer did not have an anti-union background. 14 The court also re-
versed a Board finding that the employer was guilty of refusing to bargain in
good faith.' 5 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that the interrogation,
standing alone, violated 8(a) (1).16 The court did not overrule earlier cases
in its own circuit which, on facts similar to the Jackson case, had permitted
questions under the "course of conduct" rule.17 Nor did the court indicate
that it was adopting the per se rule against employer questioning. But in
view of the fact that the "course of conduct" rule originated in the Seventh
Circuit,' 8 the Jackson holding may become an influential precedent for the
Board's rule.
Although no reasons for the Jackson holding were advanced by the court,
the apparent acceptance of the Board's approach indicates judicial recognition
that even isolated questions can frighten employees away from the union.
Despite the plausible analogy to protected employer speechmaking, employees
are more effectively coerced by questioning.' Speechmaking requires the
worker to listen to his employer's views but does not force him to reveal
his own. Questioning, on the other hand, may extract information which is
often used for subsequent reprisals. 20 Even if the employer does not use the
information to discriminate against union adherents, questions may be used
12. 201 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1953).




17. The facts of a case decided just a year earlier are strikingly similar to Jackson:
NLRB v. Arthur Winer, Inc., 194 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952).
The employer, with no anti-union background, asked three employees during an organi-
zational period about their attitude towards the union and about "what the union had to
offer." The court overruled the Board and permitted the questions, which were unaccom-
panied by other hostile acts. See also John S. Barnes Corp. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 127, 131
(7th Cir. 1951). The Jacksonr court dismissed the earlier cases by saying: "It is a close
question under such decisions as N.L.R.B. v. Arthur Winer, Inc., . . . whether such
inquiries standing alone were a violation of Sec. 8(a) (1)." NLRB v. Jackson Press,
Inc., 201 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1953).
18. See note 4 supra.
19. See notes 20-25 infra.
20. In 67 of 80 interrogation cases before the Board from May, 1951 to March, 1953,
some form of discriminatory practice occurred as a direct result of the inquiries. See
cases indexed under "Questioning" in 29, 30 LAD. REa. RE. (Ref. Man.) and cases
reported in 31 LAB. REL RE'. (Labor-Management). The usual form of reprisal was
discharge. See, e.g., Stolle Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (March 26, 1953); Griffin Mfg.
Co., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (March 17, 1953); Dixie Terminal Co., 102 N.L.R.B. No. 101
(Feb. 18, 1953); Fuchs Baking Co., 102 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (Feb. 13, 1953).
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to induce fear of retaliation.2 1 This fear will be felt not only by the vorker
interrogated, but by all other employees who hear of the questioning.2 Espe-
dally in the insecure organizational period, the employer can make a seem-
ingly innocent question suggest his displeasure with employees who support
the union.3 Such questions may convey an imagined threat of reprisal, even
if the employer intends neither the threat nor the reprisal.2 4 The coercive
effect of interrogation is illustrated by the fact that employees sometimes lie
in answer to an inquiry.25 Because of the suggestion inherent in a question,
interrogation should be analogized, not to protected speechmaking, but to
speeches containing a threat of reprisal. Such threatening speeches are clearly
prohibited under 8(a) (1) ;-6 the veiled threat which questions may communi-
cate can be even more coercive.2 7
If the "course of conduct" rule continues to be applied to questioning, an
employer will be able to wage an effective anti-union campaign, especially
if his plant is being organized for the first time. If the employer has not
had to deal with a union before, his background with employees, for purposes
of the "course of conduct" rule, will probably be friendly. By combining the
right to make speeches and to interrogate, management could conduct a pro-
gram of interviews with key workers, during which union sympathies could
be examined and employer views firmly expressed. Thus without overt
threats, influential employees might be swayed to an anti-union position or
to at least a passive one.28
21. See, e.g., Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (March 10, 1953);
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1361 (1949). Also see Morgan, Em-
ployer's Freedom of Speech and tie Wagnwr Act, 20 TuLANE L REv. 469, 499 (1946).
22. See PEams, COiILIUxICATION WITHIN IDUSTRY 26-8, 96-7 (1949).
23. For general discussion of the coercive effects of questioning, see BnaMwcmr Tn
Sroanx Wo r 235 (1932). The suggestive power of a question may be especially strong
in the "superior-to-subordinate' relationship of employer and employee. See, e.g.,
VAUGHAN, SOCIAL PsYcHoLOGY 234, 722 (1948). For a discussion of the power of sug-
gestion, see GunRmm ELEmETs OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 218-47 (1936).
24. A subordinate may attribute implications to the interrogation which were unin-
tended by the employer. For analogous situations, see VAUGHAN, op. cit. mpra note 23,
at 238.
25. In Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 N.LR.B. No. 26 (March 10, 1953), two
employees questioned about their membership in the union denied that they were members,
although in fact they were. See also Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.LLB. 1358,
1361 (1949).
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1952);
Collins Baking Co. v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1951).
27. See GtmNEz, op. cit. supra: note 23, at 245.
28. The union has some protection against a campaign of interrogation and speech-
making, since the Board may invalidate a certification election which the union loses.
This may be done even in the absence of a finding of an unfair labor practice. See, e.g.,
Cornell-Dubilier Electric Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. No. 2(9 (Jan. 19, 1953); General Shoe
Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951). For a discussion of the limited value of this protection,
see Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections: Effect of Taft-
Hartley Act Section 8(c), 58 YAiz UJ. 165 (1948).
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Any business justification for employer questioning must be weighed against
the danger of coercing employees. 29 The Board's per se rule protects the
worker without unduly burdening management. 80 In addition, when the
situation demands an exception to the overall rule, the Board as in the past
will doubtless permit inquiries as a matter of necessity and fairness.3 1 And,
while the line of illegality is shadily drawn under the "course of conduct"
doctrine, the per se rule has the virtue of predictability.
29. For discussion of business necessity as a justification for interrogation, see Note,
63 HARV. L. REv. 900, 901 (1950).
30. If an employer tried to extract such information by using spies, he would clearly
violate the act. See, e.g., NLRB v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport, 177 F.2d
119, 121 (3d Cir. 1949) ; NLRB v. 'Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 455 (4th Cir.
1944). And one circuit has forbidden interrogation of an employee concerning his co-
worker's views on an analogy to "attempted surveillance." NLRB v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1950). For the Board's similar position, see
Empire Pencil Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1189 (1949); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85
N.L.R.B. 1358, 1361 (1949).
31. See notes 10, 11 supra.
